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Conservative Activism on the
Rehnquist Court: Federal Preemption
is No Longer a Liberal Issue
James B. Staab*
As has been widely discussed, and convincingly demonstrated
elsewhere,1 the Rehnquist Court is in the midst of a constitutional
revolution in the area of federalism. By broadly interpreting the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, the five-justice conservative bloc2
has sharply limited federal authority and has resurrected the con-
cepts of state "traditional functions" and "sovereign immunity." One
notable exception to this revolution, however, has been the Court's
preemption decisions.3 Significantly, in this area the Rehnquist
Court conservatives have been as likely, or more likely, than their
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Central Missouri State Uni-
versity; B.A., Roanoke College; J.D., University of Richmond; Ph.D., Univer-
sity of Virginia. The author would like to thank his wife, Rene6 R. Staab, for
reading earlier drafts of this Article.
1. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the
Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 429 (2002);
Larry D. Kramer, Forward: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 130-32 (2001);
Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism,
1999 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 1-3 (2000); see also Steven G. Calabresi, A Constitu-
tional Revolution, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1997, at A14 (labeling a series of re-
cent Supreme Court decisions a "revolution" in federalism).
2. The Justices in the conservative bloc are Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Associate Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, An-
thony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas.
3. It should also be noted that the Rehnquist Court has done more to
tighten, rather than loosen, the restrictions that the so-called dormant Com-
merce Clause imposes on state and local governments-although in that
area, at least, in contrast to the Court's preemption cases, the conservatives
have not been the primary advocates of these restrictions. See, e.g., Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 595 (1997)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 609 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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liberal colleagues to rule in favor of the federal government. 4 This
Article examines this discrepancy in voting behavior among the
Rehnquist Court Justices, demonstrating that preemption is no
longer a liberal issue. While there are many different substantive
areas that fall under the Court's preemption doctrine (e.g., foreign
affairs, labor issues, consumer protection, nuclear energy, and the
environment), this article will focus on products liability cases. In
this area, the conservatives have read federal statutes in such a way
as to forbid states from imposing higher standards of conduct on
manufacturers through traditional common law damages actions.
By so doing, they have fulfilled the conservative political agenda of
protecting "big business" from various forms of tort liability. In an
age in which the federal courts are deciding more statutory cases,5
this is an important development in judicial policymaking. Before
examining the Rehnquist Court's products liability cases, a brief
summary of its recent Tenth and Eleventh Amendment rulings will
be provided.
I. THE REHNQUIST COURT'S FEDERALISM JURISPRUDENCE
A. Tenth Amendment
One of the chief vehicles used by the Rehnquist Court to resur-
rect states' rights has been the Tenth Amendment. In three signifi-
cant rulings in the 1990s, the Court limited the ability of the federal
government to regulate the states. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, four of the
five conservatives, plus Justice David Souter, ruled that a "plain
statement" was required before a federal statute could be inter-
preted to regulate the traditional functions of the states. 6 At issue in
the case was whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA), as amended, which forbids age discrimination in pri-
vate and public employment, applied to state judges. 7 After deter-
mining that the selection of judges was a "traditional function" of
the states, a mode of analysis previously repudiated in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,8 the majority held that
4. See infra Appendix.
5. See GUIDO CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1-7
(1982).
6. 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991).
7. Id. at 457.
8. 469 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1985); id. at 544 n.9.
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since there was no clear and manifest congressional intent to apply
the ADEA's anti-discrimination protections to state judges, it would
not do so.9 Then, in United States v. Lopez, the Court's five conserva-
tives struck down a federal law-the Gun-Free Zones Act of 1990-
as going beyond Congress's authority to regulate commerce, the first
such time the Court had done so in over 60 years.10 Finally, in Printz
v. United States, the same five conservatives imposed a limit on fed-
eral authority (the so-called "anti-commandeer" principle) that is not
supported by constitutional text, original understanding, or histori-
cal practice." At issue in Printz was the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act of 1993 (Brady Bill), which required a five-day wait-
ing period and background check before an individual could pur-
chase a handgun.12 While acknowledging that the federal law in
question was an attempt by Congress to regulate commerce, thus
making the case readily distinguishable from Lopez, the five-justice
conservative bloc viewed the requirement that local sheriffs perform
the background checks as an unfunded mandate and thus violative
of various constitutional principles of federalism.13
Taken together, one could argue that these decisions have not
substantially impacted the division of power between the national
and state governments. 4 Individually, the decisions are fairly
narrow in scope and, despite urgings from Justice Clarence Tho-
mas,15 the Court has not revisited its earlier Commerce Clause
9. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467.
10. 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
11. 521 U.S. 898, 932-33 (1997).
12. Id. at 902.
13. Id. at 935. It should also be noted that the conservatives were one
vote shy of another major victory in the federalism revolution of the 1990's.
But for Justice Anthony Kennedy's concurring opinion in U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995), the states would have the reserved
authority under the Tenth Amendment to impose term limits on members of
Congress. What is remarkable about Justice Clarence Thomas's Thornton
dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, is not so much his answer to the
precise legal question involved-whether the Qualifications Clauses forbid
the states from imposing eligibility requirements on members of Congress-
but that his opinion takes as its grounding an anti-federalist understanding
of the Constitution. Id. at 845.
14. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings
of Lopez, or What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and
Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 369, 369-71.
15. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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case law. Accordingly, the Court's Tenth Amendment decisions
can be regarded as "cautious" or as a tempering of its prior Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence. However, while there is some validity
in this assessment, it is also wide of the mark in some respects.
During the sixty-year period preceding Lopez, there was only
one decision where a federal statute was struck down for exceed-
ing Congress's commerce power, and that decision came in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery.16 There, the Court struck down
the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which ex-
tended minimum wage and maximum hour coverage to state and
local employees, on the grounds that they interfered with "tradi-
tional state" functions. 17 What came as a surprise to many was the
Court's reading of the Tenth Amendment. According to then Asso-
ciate Justice William H. Rehnquist, the author of the Court's opin-
ion, the Tenth Amendment, like the other original amendments to
the Constitution, places "an affirmative limitation" on the exercise
of national power.18 "We have repeatedly recognized," Rehnquist
wrote, "that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every
state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not be-
cause Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative au-
thority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits
it from exercising the authority in that manner." 9 The Court's de-
cision in Usery was short-lived, however. No subsequent case fol-
lowed its reasoning, and only nine years later the decision was
explicitly overturned. 20 In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, the Court rejected the idea that the Tenth
Amendment places a substantive limit on Congress's authority to
regulate commerce. 21 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, who switched
the position he had taken in Usery, found that attempts to draw
boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of "traditional"
governmental functions had proven "unworkable in practice," and
that judicially-created limitations on national authority invited
"an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which
16. 426 U.S. 833, 854-56 (1976).
17. Id. at 845.
18. Id. at 842.
19. Id. at 845.
20. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
21. Id. at 537.
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state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes."22 Despite strong
protests from the four dissenters in the case, including Justices
William H. Rehnquist and Sandra Day O'Connor,23 the Court
ruled that "the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure
the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of
the Federal Government itself."24
The insignificance of Usery is borne out by the fact that during
the decade between that decision and Garcia, the Court did not
strike down one statute on the grounds that the Tenth Amendment
posed an affirmative limit on national power. By contrast, as a re-
sult of the three aforementioned 1990 federalism decisions, the
Court has either struck down or limited the reach of several federal
statutes.25 Perhaps the most important example of the former came
in Morrison v. United States, where the conservative bloc of the
Rehnquist Court extended the Lopez reasoning to overturn a provi-
sion of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which allowed civil
actions to be brought in federal court where the underlying crime is
motivated by an animus based on the victim's gender. 26 In short, the
conservative bloc of the Rehnquist Court has resurrected the Tenth
Amendment, which was formerly regarded as a constitutional tru-
ism, 27 as a substantial limit on federal power. As Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor wrote in her opinion for the Court in New York v.
United States:
22. Id. at 546.
23. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not think it incumbent on
those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of principle that will,
I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this
Court."); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I share JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S
belief that this Court will in time again assume its constitutional responsibil-
ity.").
24. Id. at 550.
25. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidat-
ing a "take-title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act on
the grounds that Congress may not compel the states to assume liability);
United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133 (2003) (ruling that Congress
may not ban the mere possession of homemade non-commercial child pornog-
raphy); United States v. Stewart, No. 02-10318, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
23128, *30 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2003) (holding that Congress lacks the power to
ban possession of homemade machineguns).
26. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
27. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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[T]he Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the
Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a
given instance, reserve power to the States. The Tenth
Amendment thus directs us to determine... whether an
incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation
on an Article I power.28
The next section examines how the Court has revitalized the
Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity doctrine as a limit on
federal power.
B. The Eleventh Amendment
The other major vehicle by which the Rehnquist Court has
substantially limited federal authority is the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Under our dual federal system, "the Framers split the atom
of sovereignty" between the national and state governments.2 One
aspect of this dual sovereignty is that the states are immune from
certain types of suits being brought against them in federal court
without their consent. Sovereign immunity is based on the com-
mon law concept that "the king can do no wrong."30 As applied to
the United States, this means that if the states are truly sovereign
entities, it would violate their dignity as sovereign powers to allow
another sovereign entity, the United States government, to sit in
judgment of their actions.31 This idea is embedded in the Eleventh
Amendment, which provides: "The Judicial Power of the United
28. 505 U.S. at 157.
29. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
30. See Feather v. The Queen, 122 Eng. Rep. 1101, 1205 (Q.B. 1865).
31. The sovereign immunity doctrine has always been mired in contro-
versy. While it is true that the states have certain attributes of sovereignty,
they are not sovereign in the ultimate sense. The ultimate authority in the
United States is the people of the nation as a whole, which is confirmed by
the preamble to the Constitution, and which was given final validation (one
hopes) by the victory of Union forces during the Civil War. The less-than-full
sovereign nature of the states supports a modest interpretation of the Elev-
enth Amendment, which literally only prohibits the judicial power of the
United States from extending to an action against a state if the basis for fed-
eral jurisdiction is the presence of a diverse or alien party. On this view, the
Court's broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is inconsistent with
the text and original understanding of that provision. See, e.g., John J. Gib-
bons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpre-
tation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983).
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States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or eq-
uity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."32
The Eleventh Amendment was ratified in response to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, which determined
that Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution stripped the states of
sovereign immunity in actions brought in federal court by citizens
from another state. 33 That decision proved controversial, however,
and was overturned by the Eleventh Amendment in 1795.34 Read
literally, the Eleventh Amendment only forbids judicial power
from extending to suits brought against a state by citizens of an-
other state, or by citizens of foreign states, i.e., diversity jurisdic-
tion cases. However, the scope of the Amendment was substantial-
ly enlarged by the Court in Hans v. Louisiana, where it was held
that the Eleventh Amendment embodied a general principle of
state sovereign immunity, which bars federal jurisdiction of suits
by citizens against their own states, even when those suits are
based on alleged violations of the Constitution and laws of the
United States, i.e., federal question jurisdiction. 35 Even with the
Hans decision, however, the Court has recognized various excep-
tions to the states' sovereign immunity from federal suits, includ-
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
33. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420 (1793).
34. Even though the Eleventh Amendment's ratification date has tradi-
tionally been cited as January 8, 1798, the date when it was formally de-
clared part of the Constitution by a presidential message to Congress, the
more accurate (and now commonly accepted) date is February 7, 1795, the
date when it was ratified by two-thirds of the states. See THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 42 n.c (Edward S.
Corwin ed., 1953).
35. 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). For criticisms of the Hans decision as a judi-
cially activist misreading of the language and original understanding of the
Eleventh Amendment, see, for example, JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER
OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 74-
80 (1987); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction
Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 passim
(1983); Gibbons, supra note 31; Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Ju-
risprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1606-08 (2000); Vicki
C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sover-
eign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 passim (1988).
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ing (1) if the state is the plaintiff in the suit;36 (2) where a state
consents to be sued as a named defendant in the case;37 (3) where
the suit is brought by the federal government or another state
pursuant to Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution;38 (4) where
the suit is brought against a political subdivision of the state, such
as a city, county or town, which historically have not been pro-
tected by the Eleventh Amendment;39 (5) where the suit is brought
against state officials seeking prospective injunctive or declaratory
relief for ongoing violations of federal law, sometimes referred to
as the Young doctrine; 40 and (6) where federal lawsuits are
brought pursuant to Congress's abrogation authority under either
Article I of the Constitution or Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 41 In the 1990s, the Rehnquist Court, with the con-
servatives voting as a bloc in each case, actively limited or aban-
doned exceptions (5) and (6).
The Supreme Court began its reexamination of its Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flor-
ida.42 There, the Court struck down (5-4) the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act of 1988, which allowed Indian tribes to bring fed-
eral lawsuits against states for failing to negotiate in good faith an
Indian tribe's request to form a compact to operate gaming activi-
ties.43 In reaching this result, the five-justice conservative bloc
held that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity
under its Article I powers, thereby overturning the Court's 1989
decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,44 which held precisely
the opposite. In an opinion by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist,
the Court determined that the Eleventh Amendment prevents
Congress from authorizing suits against states under the Indian
36. Hans, 134 U.S. at 3.
37. Id. at 17.
38. Id. at 9.
39. Id. at 16.
40. Id. The Young doctrine takes its name from the case in which it was
established, Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which found that a suit can
be brought against a state official, as opposed to the state government itself.
Individual officers may also be sued for damages in their personal capacity,
as long as the money obtained from a judgment does not come out of the state
treasury. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
41. Hans, 134 U.S. at 3.
42. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
43. Id. at 47.
44. 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989).
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Commerce Clause. Even though the majority conceded that the
text of the Eleventh Amendment appeared "to restrict only the Ar-
ticle III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts," it claimed that
the Amendment must be understood "'not so much for what it
says, but for the presupposition.., which it confirms."' 45 That
presupposition, according to the Court, has two parts: "[F]irst,
that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and
second, that 'it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without the state's con-
sent." 46 Applying that two-part presupposition to the statute at
hand, the Court held that Article I cannot be used to circumvent
the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction un-
der a proper understanding of the Eleventh Amendment. "Even
when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making au-
thority over a particular area," Rehnquist wrote, "the Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by pri-
vate parties against unconsenting States."47 All hope did not ap-
pear lost, however, since the Court left open the possibility that
Congress could still abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant
to its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which, since it was ratified after the Civil War and
as part of the Reconstruction amendments, arguably represented
a greater erosion of state power.
The following year, the Court ruled that the Young exception
to sovereign immunity did not apply to a quiet title suit over lands
located in the state of Idaho.48 The Coeur d'Alene Tribe claimed a
proprietary interest in the banks and submerged land of Lake
Coeur d'Alene, which stretches twenty-four miles in length and
one to three miles in width, and is regarded as one of the nation's
most beautiful lakes. After an Eleventh Amendment bar was sus-
tained in federal court, the Coeur d'Alene sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against various state officials. In a five-to-four de-
cision, the conservatives, this time with Justice Anthony Kennedy
authoring the decision, ruled that the suit could not go forward
45. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village
of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
46. Id. (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 13 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at
487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
47. Id. at 72.
48. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287-88 (1997).
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against the state officials on the ground that it essentially
amounted to an action against the state itself.49 Importantly, Jus-
tice Kennedy's opinion sought to place even more limits on the
Young doctrine, but seven of the Court's Justices refused to go
along with that idea.50
In 1999, the Court heard a case involving whether the state
sovereign immunity doctrine applies to a claim brought in state
court that is based on federal law. In Alden v. Maine, state em-
ployees claimed that they were denied benefits under the Fair La-
bor Standards Act of 1938. 51 After an Eleventh Amendment bar
was sustained in federal court, the petitioners sought relief in
state court. The five-justice conservative bloc, with Justice Ken-
nedy again writing the opinion, ruled that the Eleventh Amend-
ment, properly understood, bars federal-jurisdiction claims from
being heard in state court without the state's consent. 52 Rejecting
a literal reading of the Eleventh Amendment, and relying upon
the Court's earlier analysis in Seminole Tribe of Florida, the ma-
jority maintained that the Constitution's structure and history,
congressional practice, and Court precedent supported such a
state immunity bar.53 In terms of the Court's interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment itself, this would have to be regarded as its
most far-reaching decision in this area-a sort of modern-day
Hans.
Finally, in two additional Eleventh Amendment cases the
Court reexamined whether Congress could abrogate sovereign
immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment-in each
instance ruling that it could not. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Re-
gents, the five-justice conservative bloc, with Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor writing the opinion, ruled that suits brought under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 could not be
brought in federal court. 54 In that case, several state employees
claimed age discrimination as a result of hiring and promotion
policies at various state universities and governmental agencies in
49. Id.
50. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined that part of Justice Kennedy's
opinion.
51. 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
52. Id. at 713.
53. Id.
54. 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
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Florida and Alabama.55 Then in Board of Trustees of the Univer-
sity of Alabama v. Garrett, the same five Justices, with Chief Jus-
tice William H. Rehnquist writing the opinion, ruled that federal
suits based on the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 could
not be brought against a state government without its consent. 56
In each of these cases, while acknowledging that some forms of
discrimination did in fact exist, the Court reasoned that the type
of discrimination was not serious enough for Congress to abrogate
the states' sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.57
In sum, since 1996, the conservatives have expansively inter-
preted the states' sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. Aside from what might turn out to be its narrow rul-
ing in Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, the Rehnquist Court has
stretched the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity bar to
suits claiming violations of federal rights brought in state court,
and it has gutted Congress's ability to abrogate sovereign immu-
nity under both Article I of the Constitution and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. While the individuals aggrieved under
federal laws may have other avenues of redress (e.g., a suit asking
to enjoin a state official from an ongoing violation of federal law,
or a suit commenced with the state's consent), these avenues are
not always available, and even when they are, might not provide
full monetary relief to the person harmed. The Court's Eleventh
Amendment decisions present a fundamental paradox: In earlier
cases, the major battle was over whether Congress's commerce
power extended to the states qua states. Now that the Court has
concluded that Congress has the authority to regulate the states
as governmental entities, its Eleventh Amendment decisions are
denying individuals, claiming that their federal statutory rights
have been violated, an adequate means of redress in either federal
55. Id. at 66.
56. 531 U.S. 356, 358, 374 (2001).
57. Id. at 374; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91. During its 2002-03 term, the Court
held that Congress, pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power, did abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, since there was a clear statement to abrogate such immu-
nity in the language of the statute and the Act was passed in order to redress
gender discrimination in employment, a form of discrimination requiring
heightened scrutiny. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972
(2003).
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or state court. By expansively interpreting the Eleventh Amend-
ment, the Court is protecting the financial solvency of the states
at the expense of harmed private individuals. In contrast to the
Tenth Amendment, the Rehnquist Court's interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment has been quite bold and far-reaching, and it
has not been particularly concerned about overturning its own
precedents. Taken together, the Rehnquist Court (and, in particu-
lar, the five-justice conservative bloc) has substantially limited
federal authority under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.
This is not the case with respect to the Court's preemption doc-
trine. In that area, it is the conservatives who have been the prin-
cipal supporters of the federal government.
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Under our federal system, what happens when there is a con-
flict between national and state law? If there were no way to
peacefully resolve these sorts of disputes, the United States would
be in a constant state of civil war. The doctrine of preemption,
which is derived from the Supremacy Clause, 58 provides the an-
swer. According to this doctrine, "any state law, however clearly
within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is
contrary to federal law, must yield."59 As Justice O'Connor has
recognized, the doctrine of preemption gives the federal govern-
ment "a decided advantage in [the] delicate balance" between the
states and the federal government, because "[als long as [Con-
gress] is acting within the powers granted it under the Constitu-
tion," it may reach areas traditionally regulated by the states.60
Alexander Hamilton assumed that some notion of preemption
is inherent in a federal system of government.61 In Federalist No.
33, he set forth how political power was to be divided in a repub-
lic. 62 According to him, the laws of the larger political entity-into
which smaller political societies agree to join-are the supreme
58. The Supremacy Clause provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;.., shall be the
supreme Law of the Land;... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
59. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962).
60. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
61. See THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 224-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac
Kramnick ed., 1987).
62. Id. at 225.
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law of the land.63 If otherwise, the relationship would constitute "a
mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a
government, which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND
SUPREMACY." 64 As he explained:
A Law, by the very meaning of the term, includes su-
premacy. It is a rule which those to whom it is prescribed
are bound to observe. This results from every political as-
sociation. If individuals enter into a state of society, the
laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of
their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into
a larger political society, the laws which the latter may
enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by its consti-
tution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies
and the individuals of whom they are composed. 65
There are three major ways in which the federal government
can preempt state law. The first is by expressly stating so. A fed-
eral law might simply say that it is preempting state law, either
partially or entirely. The second and third ways are implied meth-
ods. One implied method is "field" preemption, "where Congress's
legislation is so complete and the area is one requiring national
uniformity of regulation, that Congress can be said to have in-
tended to occupy the field."66 For example, comprehensive and uni-
form federal regulations fully occupy the field of foreign affairs.
The other implied method is "conflict" preemption, "where the fed-
eral and state regulations are in such conflict that state law must
yield to the federal because either (a) there is an actual conflict in
that it is impossible for a party to comply with both federal and
state regulation, or (b) state law 'stands as an obstacle' to the ac-
complishment of federal objectives and, therefore, must yield."67
This last-mentioned implied preemption doctrine known as "ob-
stacle" preemption presents the most difficulty for the reviewing
Court, because it must discern what Congress's objectives or pur-
poses were when it passed the statute. The basic issue in all pre-
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption,
53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 970 (2002).
67. Id.
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emption cases is one of congressional intent. In contrast to Tenth
Amendment cases, where the central question is whether Con-
gress has the constitutional authority to regulate a particular ac-
tivity, preemption cases ask whether Congress statutorily
intended to regulate a particular area.
What should become obvious from the products liability cases
discussed below is that the Rehnquist Court conservatives are not
opposed to ruling in favor of the federal government in preemption
cases, particularly where Congress's intent is not clearly ex-
pressed. The overall voting behavior of the Rehnquist Court Jus-
tices in preemption cases has already been mentioned.68 Since
1986, the Rehnquist Court has decided seven preemption cases in-
volving common law tort claims,69 three of which will not be dis-
cussed here because they were unanimous decisions.70 In the four
non-unanimous cases, either a four- or five-justice conservative
bloc ruled in favor of federal preemption, at least in part, while
Justice Stevens71 and Justice Breyer' 2 broke ranks with the liber-
als by separately voting in favor of preemption in two of those
cases. Interestingly, the Court's most strenuous defender of states'
rights, Justice Clarence Thomas, who has the lowest voting per-
centage among the current conservatives in siding with the fed-
eral government in preemption cases, split with his conservative
68. See infra Appendix.
69. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002); Buckman Co.
v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996);
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995); Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
505 U.S. 504 (1992); Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
70. See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 64 (holding that neither the Federal Boat
Safety Act of 1971, nor the decision of the Coast Guard in 1990 not to prom-
ulgate a regulation requiring propeller guards on motorboats, preempts
common law tort actions); Buckman Co., 531 U.S. at 353 (ruling that a state
"fraud-on-the-FDA" claim conflicted with the Food and Drug Administration's
pre-market approval procedures); Freightliner Corp., 514 U.S. at 286 (holding
that state common law claims against manufacturers of tractor-trailers were
not preempted under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1996).
71. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Cipollone, 505 U.S. at
505, 507 (finding some common law actions preempted under the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969).
72. Justice Breyer authored the majority opinion in Geier, 529 U.S. at
867 (holding that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
and the 1984 version of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 pre-
empted state common law "no-airbag" tort actions).
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colleagues in a prominent products liability case, 73 and may be an
ally for the liberals in future preemption cases. Meanwhile, among
the Court's liberals, Stephen G. Breyer, who has sided with the
federal government more than any of his other liberal colleagues
in federalism cases, has been an occasional ally of the conserva-
tives in products liability cases.74 Equally interesting, the Court's
"Mr. Right," Antonin Scalia, has shown the most inclination
among any of his colleagues (liberal or conservative) to favor the
federal government in preemption cases, thereby revealing his
Hamiltonian leanings and his pre-Court nationalist views con-
cerning products liability cases: "[Tihe federal government is not
bad but good. The trick is to use it wisely."75 In short, the conser-
vative bloc of the Rehnquist Court is favorably disposed toward
federal preemption in products liability cases. As one constitu-
tional scholar of federal preemption has put it, the Rehnquist
Court conservatives are no longer operating under the traditional
presumption against preemption, but rather have substituted in
its place a presumption in its favor.76
A. Express Preemption
1. The Regulation of Cigarettes
In one form or another, the regulation of tobacco products has
been before the Court on several occasions. 77 In Cipollone v. Lig-
73. That vote came in Geier, 529 U.S. at 885 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(joining the liberals in finding that neither the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 nor the 1984 version of the Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard 208 preempted state "no-airbag" suits).
74. See, e.g., Geier, 529 U.S. at 861, 867 (authored majority opinion rul-
ing that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and the
1984 version of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 preempted
common law "no-airbag" tort actions); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
508 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that "future incidents of [Medical
Device Amendments] pre-emption of common-law actions will [not] be 'few' or
'rare").
75. Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 19, 22 (1982).
76. Davis, supra note 66.
77. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Food
and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)
(holding that the Food and Drug Administration went beyond its delegated
authority in regulating cigarette advertising); Lorillard Tobacco Co., v. Reilly,
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gett Group, Inc., the Court had to decide whether two federal laws
regulating the labeling and advertisement of cigarette products
preempted state common-law damages claims against three to-
bacco companies. 78 In 1965, Congress enacted the Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), which mandated
health warnings on cigarette packages, but did not require similar
warnings in cigarette advertising. The stated purposes of the Act
were to (1) "adequately inform[] the public that cigarette smoking
may be hazardous to health, and to (2) protect[] the national econ-
omy from the burden imposed by diverse, non-uniform and confus-
ing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations."79 In
furtherance of the second purpose, Section 5 of the Act (under the
caption "Preemption") provided that:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other
than the statement required by Section 4 of this Act [i.e.,
smoking may be hazardous to your health], shall be re-
quired on any cigarette package, and
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be
required in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages
of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of
this Act.80
In 1969, Congress passed the Public Health Cigarette Smok-
ing Act, which amended the 1965 Act in several ways.81 Under the
1969 Act the warning label was strengthened by requiring that
the word "dangerous" be substituted for the word "hazardous," and
following a recommendation by the Federal Communication
Commission,8 2 the Act prohibited cigarette commercials on the ra-
dio and television.8 3 Finally, and most important for our purposes,
the 1969 Act modified the preemption provision as follows: "No re-
quirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
533 U.S. 525 (2001) (ruling that state cigarette advertising restrictions were
preempted under the federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act).
78. Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504.
79. Id. at 514 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1331).
80. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334).
81. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84
Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331-1338).
82. Advertisement of Cigarettes, 34 Fed. Reg. 1959 (Feb. 11, 1969) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
83. See Act cited supra note 81.
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imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promo-
tion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in confor-
mity with the provisions of this Act."84
In 1983, Rose Cipollone and her husband brought suit against
three tobacco companies, claiming that she developed lung cancer
as a result of smoking cigarettes manufactured and sold by the
companies.8 5 Their complaint alleged several theories of recovery,
including failure to warn, breach of express warranty, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and conspiracy to defraud, all of which were
based on New Jersey common law.8 6 The tobacco companies de-
fended by arguing that these common-law damages claims were
preempted by the federal laws.
The plurality, in an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens,
found some, but not all, of the common-law claims preempted. Ac-
cording to Stevens, the 1965 preemption provisions only "prohib-
ited state and federal rule-making bodies from mandating
particular cautionary statements on cigarette labels," and, there-
fore, did not foreclose additional obligations imposed under state
common law.8 7 As for the 1969 preemption provision, however,
Stevens found a broader purpose in mind: The later Act barred
"not 'simply statements' but rather 'requirement[s] or prohibi-
tion[s] ... imposed under State law,'" and it reached "beyond
statements 'in the advertising' to obligations 'with respect to the
advertising or promotion' of cigarettes.'"88 Thus, the later Act could
be read to prohibit not only positive enactments concerning the
health risks associated with smoking, but common-law damages
actions which impose a "requirement or prohibition" under state
law. Applying such an analysis to the claims in this case, the plu-
rality found the failure-to-warn and fraudulent misrepresentation
claims preempted "to the extent that those claims rellied] on omis-
sions or inclusions in respondents' advertising or promotion .... "89
However, other aspects of those claims, as well as the express
84. Pub. L. No. 91-222 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)).
85. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 509.
86. The Cipollones also raised a "design defect" claim, which was dis-
missed by the federal district court on other grounds. Id. at 512.
87. Id. at 518.
88. Id. at 520. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)).
89. Id. at 531.
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warranty and conspiracy to defraud claims, were allowed to go
forward. 90
Significantly, in reaching its conclusion the plurality relied on
two rules of statutory construction. First, it applied a plain state-
ment rule. 91 According to Justice Stevens, under the Supremacy
Clause "the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be su-
perseded" by federal law unless there is a "clear and manifest
purpose" to do so. 92 Second, the Court reasoned that "[wihen Con-
gress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in
the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that is-
sue," the Court need not infer congressional intent to preempt
state authority beyond the explicit language. 93 In other words,
Congress's enactment of a provision defining the preemptive reach
of a statute means that all doctrines of implied preemption are
foreclosed.
Justice Antonin Scalia (who was joined by Justice Clarence
Thomas) concurred in part and dissented in part.94 Scalia would
have found federal preemption of the failure-to-warn claims under
the 1965 Act, and preemption of all the common-law actions under
the 1969 Act.95 Scalia strongly objected to the plurality's "novel"
and "unprecedented" principles of statutory construction. 96 First,
he questioned the Court's application of a plain statement rule in
preemption cases.97 According to Scalia, since the Court can find
federal preemption in cases where there is no explicit statement of
preemptive intent by Congress (i.e., implied "field" or "conflict"
preemption), a requirement of a plain statement rule in cases
where explicit statements do exist "is more than somewhat odd":
To be sure, our jurisprudence abounds with rules of "plain
statement," "clear statement," and "narrow construction"
designed variously to ensure that, absent unambiguous
evidence of Congress's intent, extraordinary constitu-
90. Id. at 530.
91. Id. at 516 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 531 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 517.
94. Id. at 544-55 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. Id. at 544.
96. Id. at 544, 547.
97. Id. at 545-46.
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tional powers are not invoked, or important constitutional
protections eliminated, or seemingly inequitable doctrines
applied.... But none of those rules exists alongside a
doctrine whereby the same result so prophylactically pro-
tected from careless explicit provision can be achieved by
sheer implication, with no express statement of intent at
all. That is the novel regime the Court constructs today.98
Second, Scalia took aim at the Court's other rule of statutory
construction-if there is an express preemption provision in a fed-
eral statute, then the Court will not infer congressional intent to
preempt state authority beyond the scope of the explicit language.
According to Scalia, this rule conflicts with the prior decisions of
the Court and "works mischief" in the area of implied "conflict"
preemption:
If taken seriously, it would mean, for example, that if a
federal consumer protection law provided that no state
agency or court shall assert jurisdiction under state law
over any workplace safety issue with respect to which a
federal standard is in effect, then a state agency operat-
ing under a law dealing with a subject other than work-
place safety (e.g., consumer protection) could impose
requirements entirely contrary to federal law-
forbidding, for example, the use of certain safety equip-
ment that federal law requires. 99
Taken together, Scalia found the plurality's canons of "narrow
construction" to be "extraordinary," and argued that they would
place a presumption against federal preemption in the Court's ju-
risprudence:
The statute that says anything about pre-emption must
say everything; and it must do so with great exactitude,
as any ambiguity concerning its scope will be read in fa-
vor of preserving state power. If this be the law, surely
only the most sporting of congresses will dare to say any-
thing about pre-emption. 100
98. Id. at 546, 547.
99. Id. at 547.
100. Id. at 548.
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Justice Scalia's opinion in Cipollone strongly supports federal
preemption of state law. Unlike the plurality, he was much more
willing to assume federal preemption of the common-law damages
claims. Although the determinative question in all preemption
cases is one of congressional intent, there is wide latitude in these
types of cases for judges to reach the results they want. Moreover,
Cipollone was not crystal clear. In an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, Justice Harry A. Blackmun (who was
joined by Justices David H. Souter and Anthony M. Kennedy)
found no intent by Congress under either statute to preempt any
of the common-law actions. 1°1 The types of lawsuits that Scalia
would have preempted are also worth mentioning: those involving
state court theories of liability. These are the same types of suits
that he suggested should be preempted by the federal government
in pre-Court remarks he gave before the Federalist Society. 10 2 We
shall see that Justice Scalia's concern about reading preemptive
statutes too narrowly will be heeded by a majority of the Justices
in subsequent cases. While the conservative bloc was fractured in
Cipollone, it won a major victory in another case involving the
regulation of tobacco products, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly. 10 3
In January 1999, after the landmark settlement agreement
between forty states and the major manufacturers in the cigarette
industry, Massachusetts's Attorney General promulgated several
regulations regarding the advertisement of cigarettes, 10 4 including
101. While he agreed with the plurality's application of the two rules of
statutory construction in this case, Justice Blackmun argued that the plain
meaning of the word "requirement," as well as the legislative history of both
versions of the FCLAA, indicated that Congress did not want to preempt tra-
ditional common law damages claims. He also took issue with the plurality's
assumption that tort liability will indirectly regulate how tobacco companies
conduct business. According to Blackmun, even if a tobacco company is found
liable in a tort suit, it might still continue the practice for which it was held
responsible on the theory that the damage award is merely a cost of doing
business. Id. at 531-544 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
102. Scalia, supra note 75, at 21-22.
103. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
104. The regulations also dealt with various forms of sales practices of to-
bacco products (e.g., samples, promotional give-aways, and self-service dis-
plays), as well as the advertisement of smokeless tobacco and cigars. MASS.
REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 21.04 (2000). However, since the cigarette company pe-
titioners did not challenge the sales practices under the Supremacy Clause,
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point-of-sale and outdoor advertising restrictions. 105 The major
purpose of these regulations was to "close holes" in the settlement
agreement by eliminating deception and unfairness in the way to-
bacco products are marketed and sold to children under the legal
age. 106 Before the regulations went into effect, several tobacco
companies challenged the regulations under the Supremacy
Clause and First Amendment of the Constitution. The federal pre-
emption provision at issue was the same one as in Cipollone: "No
requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promo-
tion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in confor-
mity with the provisions of this [Act] ."107
The crucial interpretative question for the Court was whether
the FCLAA, as amended, forbade state regulations concerning the
placement of cigarette advertising. Cipollone held that some com-
mon law damages actions indirectly regulate the content of ciga-
rette warnings and thus must be preempted under the FCLAA.108
The question in Lorillard was whether the FCLAA superseded
state regulations regarding the placement of cigarette advertising,
and, if so, to what extent and in what form.109 The District Court
and the Court of Appeals agreed that the preemption issue was
ambiguous, but concluded that, based on the Supreme Court's re-
and the FCLAA regulates only cigarettes, as opposed to smokeless tobacco or
cigars, these other regulations will not be discussed here.
105. The relevant portions of the regulations state that the following ciga-
rette advertising practices are "unfair" or "deceptive":
(a) Outdoor advertising, including advertising in enclosed stadiums
and advertising from within a retail establishment that is directed
toward or visible from the outside of the establishment, in any loca-
tion that is within a 1,000 foot radius of any public playground,
playground area in a public park, elementary school or secondary
school;
(b) Point-of-sale advertising of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco prod-
ucts any portion of which is placed lower than five feet from the floor
of any retail establishment accessible to persons younger than 18
years old, which is located within a 1,000 foot radius of any public
playground, playground area in a public park, elementary school or
secondary school.
Id. tit. 940, § 21.04(5)(a)-(b).
106. Id. § 21.01.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000).
108. 505 U.S. at 521.
109. 533 U.S. at 532.
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quirement of a plain statement rule in preemption cases, as well
as the traditional deference given to the states in the areas of land
use zoning and public health, the state regulations should not be
preempted.llo That view was embraced almost universally by all of
the circuit courts that had addressed the issue,"1 where the com-
mon thread of reasoning was that the FCLAA preempts regula-
tions about the content of cigarette advertising, not the states'
ability to regulate the location of cigarette advertisements, such as
signs or billboards. In addition, the Massachusetts's Attorney
General maintained that the cigarette advertising regulations
were not preempted because they were not "based on smoking and
health," but rather were aimed at strengthening compliance with
laws prohibiting the sale or distribution of tobacco products to
children by reducing their exposure to cigarette advertising. 112 In
an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the five-justice con-
servative bloc rejected these arguments. Justice O'Connor rejected
the state attorney general's interpretation of the "based on smok-
ing and health" clause as too narrow." 3 According to Justice
O'Connor, Congress, in enacting the 1969 preemption provision,
was not concerned merely with health warnings for cigarettes, but
was equally concerned about children being inundated with im-
ages of cigarette smoking and advertising."4 "At bottom," she rea-
soned, "the concern about youth exposure to cigarette advertising
is intertwined with the concern about cigarette smoking and
health. Thus the Attorney General's attempt to distinguish one
concern from the other must be rejected."115 Moreover, while
O'Connor conceded that the "content versus location distinction
has some surface appeal," she was not persuaded by that reason-
ing either." 6 According to Justice O'Connor, if the states are free
110. Id. at 537-40.
111. See Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30, 41 (1st Cir. 2000);
Greater N.Y. Metro. Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, 195 F.3d 100, 109 (2d Cir.
1999); Fed'n of Adver. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 189
F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 1999); Penn Adver. of Balt., Inc. v. Mayor & City
Council of Balt., 63 F.3d 1318, 1324 (4th Cir. 1995). Contra Lindsey v. Ta-
coma-Pierce County Health Dep't, 195 F.3d 1065, 1072-75 (9th Cir. 1999).
112. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 546-47.
113. Id. at 547.
114. Id. at 547-48.
115. Id. at 548.
116. Id.
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to regulate the placement of cigarette advertising, then they could
prohibit them altogether-a result, in her view, at odds with the
plain language of the FCLAA.117 As she put it, "Congress wished
to ensure that 'a State could not do through negative mandate
(e.g., banning all cigarette advertising) that which it was already
forbidden to do through positive mandate (e.g., mandating
particular cautionary statements)."' 118
The dissent, written by Justice John Paul Stevens, and joined
by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
Breyer, rejected a literal reading of the FCLAA's preemption pro-
vision for its underlying purposes. 19 Justice Stevens reminded the
majority that the basic purposes of the preemption provision were:
(1) to inform the public that smoking may be hazardous, and (2) to
ensure that commerce and the interstate economy not be impeded
by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and ad-
vertising regulations. 20 As he saw it, these purposes, which were
not substantially modified by the 1969 amendments, indicated
that Congress was mainly concerned about the administrative
burdens and costs that tobacco companies would have to bear if
they had to comply with different labeling and advertising re-
quirements in sundry locales across the United States.' 2' How-
ever, a similar line of reasoning would not apply to the placement
of cigarette advertisements, such as billboards and signs, since to-
bacco companies (as well as all other advertisers) have to comply
with various local zoning regulations anyway. According to this
view, if the states want to take the extra-precautionary measure
of protecting the health and safety of minors by limiting the ad-
vertisements directed at them, nothing under the FCLAA prohib-
its them from doing so. Although Stevens was convinced that the
FCLAA was not intended to supersede the states' regulation of the
placement of cigarette advertisements, he noted that even if the
preemption provision could be regarded as ambiguous, under
clearly established preemption jurisprudence the Court should de-
fer to the states and their historic police powers unless there is a
clear and manifest purpose by Congress to trump state law.
117. Id. at 546.
118. Id. at 549 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett, 505 U.S. 504, 539 (1992)).
119. Id. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)).
121. See generally id. at 595-96.
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Lorillard was an important victory for the conservatives.
While the case did not involve a products liability claim, it did in-
volve the states' ability to regulate land usage and public health,
two traditional state functions. As in most statutory interpreta-
tion cases, the preemption question in Lorillard was ambiguous.
On the one hand, the plain language of the statute could be read
to eliminate the states' ability to regulate cigarette advertising al-
together. However, such "uncritical literalism" yields results that
Congress surely did not intend. For example, "it could divest the
states and municipalities of authority to prevent tobacco advertis-
ers from posting their ads in public buildings even though smok-
ing is legally prohibited there," or "it could lead to the conclusion
that 'states [are] without power to prohibit a cigarette company
from handing out free cigarettes in an elementary school yard."'1
22
In order to avoid such absurd results, an examination of legisla-
tive intent is necessary, and, as Justice Stevens pointed out,
FCLAA's legislative history does not suggest that Congress
wanted to divest the states of all regulatory authority over ciga-
rette advertising. Principled defenders of states' rights would not
read the FCLAA in such a way that the states have no role in this
area. Yet, that is what happened in Lorillard. There, in contrast
to the Court's Tenth Amendment decisions, in which the conserva-
tives have sought to preserve an enclave of state authority under
the previously repudiated "traditional functions" analysis, little
deference was given to two traditional state functions-land usage
and public health. While Lorillard does raise some legitimate
First Amendment issues, 123 the conservatives' literal reading of
122. Greater N.Y. Metro. Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, 195 F.3d 100, 105
(2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Fed'n of Adver. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of
Chicago, 189 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 1999)).
123. All of the Justices agreed that the outdoor regulations prohibiting
cigarette advertising "within a 1,000 foot radius of any public playground,
playground area in a public park, elementary school or secondary school,"
were constitutionally suspect. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 22.06(5)(a)-(b)
(2000). In commercial speech cases, the Court applies the Central Hudson
test, which requires that in order for a regulation to survive a First Amend-
ment challenge, it must satisfy a four-prong test: (1) whether the activity
regulated is legal, (2) whether the asserted governmental interest is substan-
tial, (3) whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and (4) whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980). All of the Justices agreed that the outdoor regulations
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FCLAA's preemption provision cannot be explained simply as a
matter of different interpretative philosophies, since in Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., the conservatives relied upon admin-
istrative intent instead of the plain meaning of a federal statute to
preclude common law tort claims. 124
By the Court disallowing states the ability to regulate ciga-
rette advertising, the tobacco industry reaps a substantial mone-
tary windfall. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) estimates
that eighty-two percent of adult smokers begin to smoke before
the age of eighteen. 125 If there is a cause and effect relationship
between cigarette advertising and underage smoking (and both
common sense and government and academic studies dictate that
there is126), then the tobacco industry stands to profit from the
Court's decision-which is why in 1999 the cigarette industry
spent $8.24 billion on advertising and promotions, the largest ex-
penditure ever.127 Lorillard should not be read in isolation either.
The Court has also ruled that the FDA does not have the author-
ity under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 to regulate to-
bacco as a drug. 28 There is a certain irony to the Court's decision
in Lorillard. In United States v. Lopez, the Court ruled that Con-
were at best dubious in light of the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test,
requiring that the regulations be narrowly tailored and that there be a rea-
sonable fit between the means and ends of the regulatory scheme. At trial,
the tobacco companies presented evidence that the regulations would prevent
cigarette advertising in approximately ninety percent of the major metropoli-
tan areas in Massachusetts, such as Boston, Worcester, and Springfield. In
addition to this, the statute broadly defines "advertisement" to mean "any
oral, written, graphic, or pictorial statement or representation, made by, or
on behalf of, any person who manufactures, packages, imports for sale, dis-
tributes or sells within Massachusetts [tobacco products], the purpose of
which is to promote the use or sale of the product." tit. 940, § 21.03. The ma-
jor difference among the Justices was that the majority found the regulations
unconstitutional at the summary judgment stage, while the dissenters would
have sent the case back to trial for further development of the record as to
whether the regulations were overbroad. Id. at 571-606.
124. See 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
125. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 128, 161
(2000).
126. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 84 F. Supp. 2d 180, 186-87 (Mass.
Dist. Ct. 2000) (quoting Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Defendant's Motion, which provides the studies substantiating
such a link (Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 8)).
127. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 545 (2001).
128. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 161.
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gress was without power to regulate gun possession within one-
thousand feet of a private or public school.129 Here, by contrast,
the same five Justices ruled that Congress intended to preempt
state law regulating underage smoking within one-thousand feet
of a public playground, park, or elementary or secondary school. 130
2. Pacemakers
In another important express preemption case, the Court was
sharply divided over whether the Medical Device Amendments
(MDA or Act) of 1976131 preempted state common-law negligence
claims against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective pace-
maker. 132 The MDA was enacted by Congress "to provide for the
safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human
use,"' 33 and delegates to the FDA the responsibility of evaluating
and approving, through a "premarket approval" (PMA) process, all
new medical devices. The extent of the FDA's pre-market review
depends largely on the degree of potential risk to human health
presented by the medical device, and the Act classifies medical de-
vices into three categories. Class I devices are noncritical products
that pose no unreasonable risk of illness or injury and thus are
governed by general manufacturing controls; Class II devices pos-
sess a greater potential for harm and therefore warrant more
stringent performance controls; Class III devices present the
greatest degree of risk to human health and (but for the excep-
tions noted below) undergo the strictest pre-market scrutiny. 34
Almost all life-sustaining devices, including pacemakers and heart
valves, are Class III devices.
In order for a medical device to be introduced into the market,
an applicant must demonstrate to the FDA with a "reasonable as-
surance" that the device is both safe and effective. 135 This PMA re-
view is rigorous and the FDA spends an average of 1,200 hours on
129. 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
130. Id. at 600-01.
131. Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90
Stat. 539 (1976) (codified as 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k (2002)).
132. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 470 (1996).
133. Id. at 474 (citing 90 Stat. 539).
134. Id. at 476-77 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(A)-(C)).
135. Id. at 477.
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each submission.136 As part of a PMA request, for example, the
applicant must provide full scientific reports of all information
concerning investigations undertaken to show whether the device
is safe and effective. 137 In addition, the FDA refers the approval
question to a panel of outside experts, conducts its own, in-depth
review, and the Act allows interested persons to file a petition to
review the approval of a device. However, because of two major
exceptions, not all Class III devices on the market today have re-
ceived PMA review: (1) pre-market devices are "grandfathered"
until the FDA has had time to complete the PMA, and (2) devices
that are "substantially equivalent" to preexisting devices may
avoid the process "until the FDA initiates the PMA process for the
underlying pre-1976 device to which the new device is 'substan-
tially equivalent. '" 38
Even though "substantially equivalent" Class III devices do
not have to go through the rigorous PMA review, a manufacturer
attempting to market a new device must submit a "premarket no-
tification" to the FDA-a process known as "Section 510(k)" re-
view.139 Significantly, however, the Section 510(k) review is a less
demanding process. The applicant does not have to show that its
device is safe and effective, but rather must show that it is "sub-
stantially equivalent" to a pre-1976 device. Moreover, the FDA
spends much less time in reviewing Section 510(k) applications
than it does in reviewing PMA requests. A House subcommittee
determined that while PMA review takes approximately 1,200
hours to complete, the FDA spends on average only twenty hours
in reviewing a "substantially equivalent" request. 40 Finally, Sec-
tion 510(k) requests have a higher rate of approval. While as much
as twenty-five percent of PMA devices are rejected each year, only
two percent of Section 510(k) requests are declined annually.'4 ' In
136. Id. (citing Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of
the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 384 (1987)
[hereinafter 1987 Hearings]).
137. Id. at 491 n.12 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(3)(A)).
138. Id. at 478; 21 U.S.C. §§ 360e(b)(1)(A)-(B).
139. Id. (noting that the name for the process is derived from the number
of the section from the original Act).
140. Id. at 479 (citing 1987 Hearings, supra note 136, at 384).
141. Jonathan S. Kahan, Premarket Approval Versus Premarket Notifica-
tion: Different Routes to the Same Market, 39 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 510, 516-
17 (1984).
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short, because Section 510(k) review is the least costly, quickest,
and most effective method of clearing the FDA's regulatory hur-
dles, it has become the option of choice for manufacturers. A 1983
House Report, for example, "concluded that nearly 1,000 of ap-
proximately 1,100 Class III devices that had been introduced to
the market since 1976 were admitted as 'substantial equivalents'
and without any PMA review."142 And while the statistics have
improved somewhat, another investigation performed by the
House in 1990 found "that 80% of new Class III devices were being
introduced to the market through the Section 510(k) process and
without PMA review." 43
Taking advantage of this expedited review process, Med-
tronic's pacemaker lead-the wire carrying electrical impulses
from the pacemaker to the patient's heart-was approved by the
FDA as a "substantial equivalent" in October 1982.14 In 1987,
Lora Lohr was implanted with a Medtronic pacemaker containing
one of the company's leads, which then failed three years later,
"allegedly resulting in a 'complete heart block' that required
emergency surgery."145 In the opinion of Lohr's physician, the lead
was defective and the likely cause for the pacemaker's failure.' 46
In 1993, Lohr and her husband filed suit against Medtronic in a
Florida state court, claiming several different theories of liability,
including: (1) negligent design, (2) non-compliance with federal
standards, (3) negligent manufacture, and (4) negligent failure to
warn. 147 Medtronic defended by claiming that all of the actions
were preempted by Section 360k of the MDA, which prohibits any
state requirement "which is different from, or in addition to" the
requirements under the MDA, and which "relates to the safety
and effectiveness of the device."148
142. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 479 (quoting SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & IN-
VESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COM., MEDICAL DEVICE REGULA-
TION: THE FDA's NEGLECTED CHILD 34 (Comm. Print 1983)).
143. Id. at 479-80 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-808, at 14 (1990)); see also
David A. Kessler, Stuart M. Pape, & David N. Sundwall, The Federal Regula-
tion of Medical Devices, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 357, 359 (1987) (§ 510(k) noti-
fications are filed for each PMA application; average FDA response to
§ 510(k) notification is one-fifth the response time to a PMA).
144. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 480.
145. Id. at 480-81.
146. Id. at 481.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 481-82 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(a) (1995)).
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The plurality, in an opinion written by Justice John Paul Ste-
vens and joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, rejected Medtronic's far-reaching claim. 149
In terms of the plain language of the statute, Stevens distin-
guished the MDA's use of the word "requirement" from the
FCLAA's use of the same word, where in Cipollone six of the Jus-
tices (including himself) found that state "requirements" do in-
clude indirect regulations, such as common law liability.150 For
Stevens, the major distinction between the two statutes was in the
preclusionary scope of such an interpretation. 15' While in Cipol-
lone the plaintiff was not precluded from maintaining some com-
mon law causes of action, in the MDA context a similar
interpretation of "requirement" would "require far greater inter-
ference with state legal remedies, producing a serious intrusion
into state sovereignty while simultaneously wiping out the possi-
bility of remedy for the Lohrs' alleged injuries." 52 Citing the fa-
mous preemption case Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp,153 in which a
personal injury claim was allowed to go forward under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, Stevens noted that it is "difficult to believe
that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judi-
cial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."154 Bearing in
mind the presumption against preemption, the primary purpose
and the legislative history of the MDA, as well as the intended
meaning of "requirement" as used in other sections of the stat-
Section 360k. State and local requirements respecting devices
(a) General rule. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue
in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any re-
quirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the de-
vice under this chapter.
§ 360(k)(a) (1995).
149. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 487.
150. Id. at 486-91.
151. See id. at 487.
152. Id. at 488-89.
153. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
154. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 487 (quoting Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251).
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ute, 155 Stevens could find no legislative intent to support such an
all-inclusive reach of the preemption clause. As he put it, such an
interpretation would "have the perverse effect of granting com-
plete immunity from design defect liability to an entire industry
that, in the judgment of Congress, needed more stringent regula-
tion in order 'to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical
devices intended for human use. '" 156
Medtronic argued that even if all common law actions were
not preempted under the MDA, the specific ones alleged here
should be.157 The majority rejected that argument as well. With
respect to the defective design claim, all of the Justices found that
the pre-market notification process did not impose a "require-
ment" on the design of Medtronic's pacemaker. 58 The pacemaker
was not subjected to any FDA design safety review, but was
merely found by the FDA to be "substantially equivalent" to a pre-
1976 grandfathered device. 59 Moreover, in granting Section
510(k) approval, the FDA emphasized that it did "not in any way
denote official approval of [the] device," and that "any representa-
tion that creates an impression of official approval of this device
because of compliance with the pre-market notification is mislead-
ing and constitutes misbranding."60 Accordingly, under the
MDA's preemption clause, no "requirement" as to the pacemaker's
design had been established by the FDA, and the Lohrs, therefore,
could not seek a requirement "different from, or in addition to" a
requirement which did not exist. 16' In short, as the Court of Ap-
peals below noted, "the 510(k) process is focused on equivalence,
not safety."162
155. After examining other sections of the MDA, Stevens concluded that
the word "requirement" was intended to prohibit positive laws passed by
state legislatures and executives, not common law damage claims awarded by
juries or judges. Id. at 487.
156. Id. (quoting Act of May 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-925, § 1(a), 1976 (90
Stat.) 359 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360)).
157. Id. at 492.
158. Id. at 493-94.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 493 (quoting FDA Substantial Equivalence Letter, 21 C.F.R.
§ 807.97 (1984)).
161. Id. at 500.
162. Id. at 493 (quoting Lohr v. Medtronic, 56 F.3d 1335, 1348 (11th Cir.
1995)).
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As for the non-compliance with federal standards claim, the
Lohrs argued that state requirements alleging that Medtronic did
not comply with federal manufacturing and labeling requirements
were not preempted if they merely duplicate some or all of the
federal standards-another contention that all of the Justices
agreed with. 163 To the extent the plaintiff merely sought to enforce
federal law, she did not seek to impose requirements "different
from, or in addition to," those imposed by the FDA.164 "The pres-
ence of a damages remedy," wrote Justice Stevens, "does not
amount to the additional or different 'requirement' that is neces-
sary under the statute; rather, it merely provides another reason
for manufacturers to comply with identical existing 'requirements'
under federal law."165 This view was aided by an FDA regulation,
which stated that Section 360k "does not preempt State or local
requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, re-
quirements imposed under the Act."1 66
Finally, and where a difference of opinion did arise among the
Justices, the majority allowed the negligent manufacture and fail-
ure-to-warn claims to go forward. 67 Here, the Lohrs argued that
even if the state requirements are "different from, or in addition
to," the federal standards they should still not be preempted, be-
cause the federal guidelines are not device-specific, and thus are
not requirements "with respect to a device" under the statute. 68
For support of this view, the Lohrs relied upon an FDA regulation,
which provides that state requirements are preempted "only"
when the FDA has established "specific requirements applicable to
a particular device."' 69 The majority, following the two-part test
established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., deferred to the FDA's construction of the MDA,
163. Id. at 497-502.
164. Id. at 500-02.
165. Id. at 495.
166. Id. at 496-97 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(2) (1995)).
167. Id. at 497.
168. Id. at 498-99.
169. Id. at 506. The FDA regulation states: "State... requirements are
preempted only when ... there are ... specific [federal] requirements appli-
cable to a particular device... thereby making any existing divergent
State ... requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition
to, the specific [federal] requirements." 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995) (emphasis
added).
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since, in its view, the preemption provision was unclear. 170 While
the FDA does have Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) regula-
tions, which establish general requirements for most steps in
every device's manufacture, as well as labeling requirements,
which require devices to bear various use and warning labels, the
majority regarded these requirements as too general and not de-
vice-specific, as required by the FDA regulation. 171 Accordingly,
the majority ruled that all of the Lohrs' claims could go forward. 172
The scope of the word "requirement" under the MDA, as ap-
plied to the negligent manufacture and failure-to-warn claims,
was the major point of disagreement between the majority and
dissenting opinions. In an opinion concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, ruled that the negli-
gent manufacture and failure-to-warn claims were preempted by
the MDA. 173 The dissent differed with the majority in its applica-
tion of the Chevron test. According to this test, if the legislative in-
tent is clear, then deference should not be given to an
administrative agency's construction of the statute.174 Relying on
the reasoning provided in Cipollone, the dissent argued that the
MDA's use of the word "requirement" was not ambiguous, and
thus some of the common law actions were preempted under the
Act.175 In Justice O'Connor's view, the FDA's GMP regulations im-
pose comprehensive requirements relating to every aspect of the
device-manufacturing process. 176 Accordingly, the dissenters ar-
gued that "the Lohrs' common-law claims regarding manufacture
would, if successful, impose state requirements 'different from, or
in addition to,' the GMP requirements, and are therefore pre-
empted." 177 Moreover, the dissent argued that the Lohrs' failure-
to-warn claim was preempted by the FDA's labeling require-
ments.178
170. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 495-97 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
171. Id. at 497-500.
172. Id. at 503.
173. Id. at 509-14.
174. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45.
175. Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 571 (1992).
176. Id. at 513.
177. Id. at 514.
178. Id.
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The two significant votes in Lohr were those of Justices Ken-
nedy and Breyer. Justice Kennedy provided a pivotal vote allow-
ing the Lohrs' common law claims to go forward-a position
similar to the one he took in Cipollone.179 Justice Breyer's concur-
ring opinion, however, might turn out to be the more important.
While Breyer agreed with the majority that all of the common law
actions should not be preempted in this case, he disagreed with
any language in the plurality decision suggesting that the MDA
could not preempt common law suits.180 He, like the dissenters,
felt that the word "requirement" should be read to include conflict-
ing theories of state common law.l8l Here, however, he could find
no actual conflict between the federal requirements and the Lohrs'
common law claims. 8 2 Accordingly, at least five of the Lohr Jus-
tices were of the view that Section 360k of the MDA does preempt
some common law actions. 83 Indeed, Justice Breyer, in rejecting
the plurality's reading of the preemption provision, maintained
that "future incidents of MDA pre-emption of common-law actions
will [not] be 'few' or 'rare."' 184
The conservatives cannot claim substantial victories in the
aforementioned express preemption cases, but the decisions
should not be read as conservative defeats either. In Cipollone, six
of the Justices concluded that the word "requirement" should be
read to include common law damages awards. 85 Although it was
not a products liability case, the conservatives also won a major
victory in Lorillard, where the five-justice conservative bloc ruled
that the states did not have the ability to regulate cigarette adver-
tising under the FCLAA.18 6 The impact of Lohr will depend on how
Justice Breyer votes in subsequent cases. Many new medical de-
vices will go through the Section 510(k) pre-market notification
process, and it is certainly possible that a majority of the Justices
will find some common law actions preempted under the MDA.
Moreover, in the aftermath of Medtronic, the federal courts of ap-
179. Id. at 485.
180. Id. at 503.
181. Id. at 504.
182. Id. at 508.
183. See id. at 503, 509, 511.
184. Id. at 508.
185. Id. at 521.
186. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
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peal have reached inconsistent results with respect to the MDA's
preemption of failure-to-warn claims,18 7 and in the only case in
which the Supreme Court has reexamined the scope of the MDA's
preemption provision, the Justices ruled unanimously that a
"fraud-on-the-FDA" claim conflicted with the FDA's pre-market
approval procedures. 88 In the next section, we shall see that the
conservatives have had more success in implied preemption cases,
where there is substantially more discretion for the Justices to
substitute their own policy views for those of Congress.
B. Implied Preemption
1. Passive Restraints
At issue in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. was whether
the 1984 version of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
208 (FMVSS 208), dealing with occupant crash protection, pre-
empts state "no-air bag" tort claims based on common law theories
of negligence and design defect.189 The National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA or Safety Act) was enacted in 1966
to "reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons re-
sulting from traffic accidents," 90 and delegated the power to cre-
ate federal motor vehicle safety standards to the Department of
Transportation (DOT). Specifically, Congress authorized DOT to
provide "minimum" safety standards for all automobiles to be sold
in the United States. 91
DOT's promulgation of FMVSS 208 has a long and convoluted
history. Beginning in 1967, DOT simply required that all automo-
biles be equipped with manual seatbelts.192 Upon discovering that
people were not buckling up, however, DOT then required the in-
187. Compare Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir.
1997) (finding state failure-to-warn claims preempted under FDA regula-
tions), with Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 789 (10th Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing state failure-to-warn claims not preempted by FDA regulations).
188. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341,350 (2001).
189. 529 U.S. 861, 874 (2000).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988) (repealed 1994).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2) (1988) (repealed 1994) (defining "safety standard"
as a "minimum standard for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle
equipment performance").
192. Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208, 32 Fed. Reg. 2415 (Feb. 3,
1967).
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stallation of passive restraint devices, such as automatic seatbelts
and airbags. 193 Administrative rulemaking involves political
choices, and the regulation of passive restraints is certainly no ex-
ception. Immediately before leaving office, President Gerald Ford's
administration adopted a version of FMVSS 208 that afforded
automobile manufacturers a choice between installing manual
seatbelts and passive restraints. 94 In July 1977, Jimmy Carter's
administration reversed course by requiring the installation of
passive restraint devices in all automobiles. 195 That rule was sub-
sequently rescinded by Ronald Reagan's administration in October
1981, leading to a confrontation at the high court, where the Jus-
tices struck down the rescission order as arbitrary and capricious
under the Administrative Procedure Act.196 Finally, in July 1984,
then-Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole adopted a safety
standard allowing for the gradual phase-in of passive restraints,
which is the subject of this litigation.' 97 According to this imple-
mentation plan, vehicle manufacturers were required to equip a
minimum of ten percent of their new passenger cars with passive
restraints by 1987, a percentage that would then grow in three
annual stages until September 1989, when one hundred percent of
all new cars had to be equipped with such devices. 198 Among the
many reasons cited for the gradual implementation plan 99 were
the needs to encourage public acceptance of airbag technology and
to promote experimentation with better passive restraint sys-
tems.200 Such a gradual plan, DOT believed, would give auto
manufacturers a choice in the type of passive restraints to install
in their cars, as well as flexibility in equipping their cars with pas-
sive restraints over a period of time.20'
193. 35 Fed. Reg. 16927 (Oct. 21, 1970).
194. 42 Fed. Reg. 5071 (Jan. 27, 1977) (regulation issued on January 19,
1977).
195. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289 (July 5, 1977).
196. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983).
197. 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962 (July 17, 1984).
198. Id.
199. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 877-84 (2000) (discuss-
ing the many factors considered by DOT in promulgating the 1984 version of
the FMVSS).
200. Id. at 900 (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 166 F.3d 1236 (D.C.
Cir. 1999)).
201. Id. at 900-01.
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In 1992, Alexis Geier was seriously injured when the 1987
Honda Accord she was driving collided with a tree. 20 2 The car was
equipped with manual shoulder and lap belts, which Geier had
buckled up at the time.203 However, the car was not equipped with
airbags or other passive restraint devices. 204 It is undisputed that
American Honda Motor Company (Honda) was in full compliance
with DOT's minimum standard at the time; ten percent of its ve-
hicles were equipped with passive restraints. 2 5 Geier and her
parents brought suit under District of Columbia tort law, alleging
that Honda was negligent in not equipping the Accord with a
driver's side airbag.20 6 Honda defended by arguing that the suit
was expressly and impliedly preempted under the NTMVSA and,
in particular, the 1984 version of FMVSS 208.207 The NTMVSA's
express preemption provision states in pertinent part:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard estab-
lished under this subchapter is in effect, no State or po-
litical subdivision of a State shall have any authority
either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to
any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment[,]
any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of per-
formance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is
not identical to the Federal standard.208
Relying upon the Court's decision in Cipollone, Honda claimed
that the NTMVSA's prohibition of different automobile "safety
standards" by the states, like the FCLAA's prohibition of different
state "requirements" for the labeling and advertisement of ciga-
rettes, should be read to preclude common law tort actions against
automobile manufacturers that are in compliance with the mini-
mum standards of FMVSS 208.209 However, unlike the statute in
Cipollone, the NTMVSA also contained a saving clause, explicitly
exempting common law actions from the preemption provision:
"Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard is-
202. Id. at 865.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 879.
206. Id. at 865.
207. Id. at 867-68.
208. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (repealed 1994).
209. Geier, 529 U.S. at 867.
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sued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any
liability under common law."210
The central question for the Court was how to square
NTMVSA's express preemption provision with its saving clause.
In an opinion by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, who was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Ken-
nedy, the majority ruled that Geier's common law suit was pre-
empted by the NTMVSA and the 1984 version of the FMVSS
208.211 According to Breyer, while the NTMVSA did not expressly
preempt the common law actions, it, along with FMVSS 208, did
impliedly preempt them under the Court's conflict preemption ju-
risprudence. 212 As for the express preemption claim, the Court
found that the saving clause did preserve some common law ac-
tions.21 3 Without making fine distinctions between the word "re-
quirement" under the FCLAA and the phrase "safety standard"
under the NTMVSA, the majority found that the express preemp-
tion provision must be read in conjunction with the saving clause,
and that that clause clearly contemplates the ability to bring some
common law actions under state law.214 As a matter of statutory
interpretation, Justice Breyer argued that a statute's inclusion of
a saving clause requires that a preemption provision be read nar-
rowly.21 5 To read the preemption provision as an absolute ban on
common law actions, he reasoned, would be to ignore the express
language of the saving clause. 216
At the same time, the majority found that the saving clause
did not bar the Court from applying its conflict preemption juris-
prudence to determine whether common law actions would frus-
trate FMVSS 208's purpose of having a gradual implementation of
passive restraint devices-a conclusion seemingly at odds with the
rules of construction announced by the Court in Cipollone.21 7 After
210. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) (repealed 1994).
211. Geier, 529 U.S. at 874-75.
212. Id. at 867-69.
213. Id. at 869-74.
214. Id. at 870-74.
215. Id. at 869-70.
216. Id. at 870.
217. Id. at 874-82. Recall that in Cipollone, seven Justices agreed that if
Congress enacted a provision defining the preemptive reach of a statute, then
all doctrines of implied preemption were not to be considered. 505 U.S. 504,
517 (1992).
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considering various sources of administrative intent-including
DOT's litigation strategy since 1989 concerning the federal safety
standard, the regulatory history of passive restraint devices, and
DOT's commentary on the 1984 version of FMVSS 208-the ma-
jority determined that "no-air bag" lawsuits would frustrate the
overall purpose of FMVSS 208 by penalizing automobile manufac-
turers for not doing something they were not required to do.218 The
duties imposed under common law, Justice Breyer reasoned,
would require that all 1987 passenger cars be equipped with an
airbag, which is an outcome at odds with the basic purposes of
DOT's gradual phase-in program. 219 Justice Breyer also stressed
Congress's goal of uniformity in automobile safety standards when
it passed NTVSA, and that such an objective would be frus-
trated by multiple and varied common law actions:
[T]he pre-emption provision itself reflects a desire to sub-
ject the industry to a single, uniform set of federal safety
standards. Its pre-emption of all state standards, even
those that might stand in harmony with federal law, sug-
gests an intent to avoid the conflict, uncertainty, cost, and
occasional risk to safety itself that too many different
safety-standard cooks might otherwise create.... This
policy by itself favors pre-emption of state tort suits, for
the rules of law that judges and juries create or apply in
such suits may themselves similarly create uncertainty
and even conflict, say, when different juries in different
States reach different decisions on similar facts. 2 0
The dissent, written by Justice John Paul Stevens, and joined
by Justices David Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, accused the majority of judicial legislating.221 At the
outset of his opinion, Justice Stevens ironically proclaimed: "This
is a case about federalism," 222 and about "respect for 'the constitu-
tional role of the States as sovereign entities."'223 In response to
Honda's claim that the Geiers' common law actions were expressly
218. Geier, 529 U.S. at 885-86.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 871.
221. Id. at 888.
222. Id. at 887 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991)).
223. Id. at 887 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999)).
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preempted, Justice Stevens distinguished Congress's use of "re-
quirement" under the FCLAA from "safety standard" under the
NTMVSA.224 According to Stevens, unlike "requirement," the ordi-
nary meaning of "safety standard," as well as its usage in other
sections of the NTMVSA, indicates that Congress intended to pre-
clude positive enactments by legislatures and administrative
agencies, not "case specific decisions by judges and juries that re-
solve common-law claims."225 Second, in other cases in which the
Court has found some common law actions superseded by broad
preemptive language such as "requirement," the statute did not
include a saving clause.226 The saving clause here explicitly ex-
empts common law liability from the scope of the preemption pro-
vision.227 As a result, the text of the statute itself establishes that
the NTMVSA did not intend to expressly preempt common law
tort claims. 228
Justice Stevens, however, saved his most biting criticism of
the majority's analysis for his discussion of implied conflict pre-
emption principles. As an initial matter, Justice Stevens did not
believe that the application of such principles was appropriate in
this case.229 Because the statute included a saving clause explicitly
exempting common law claims from the scope of the preemption
provision, he argued that Honda had to satisfy a "special burden"
before the Court would apply its implied conflict preemption
analysis. 230 Honda rested its implied preemption argument on con-
flict "obstacle" grounds (i.e., that "no-air bag" suits would frustrate
the basic purposes of FMVSS 208).231 For support of this conten-
tion, Honda relied upon various forms of administrative intent, in-
cluding DOT's litigation strategy involving FMVSS 208, the
history of passive restraint regulation generally, and DOT's com-
mentary on the final version of the federal safety standard.232 Jus-
tice Stevens argued that these sources of law were not sufficient to
overcome the presumption against preemption when a statute
224. Id. at 896.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 897- 898.
227. Id. at 898.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 887-88.
230. Id. at 898.
231. Id. at 899.
232. Id. at 896.
2003]
168 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.9:129
contains a saving clause. 233 He could find no prior case where the
Court had applied implied conflict analysis solely on the basis of
administrative intent.234 In contrast to congressional statutes or
administrative regulations, where the Court had previously ap-
plied conflict "obstacle" analysis, administrative intent is not sub-
ject to the formal rules and procedures of the democratic process.
None of the sources of law relied upon by Honda, for example,
were ever promulgated in the Federal Register, and thus the pub-
lic and the states did not have an opportunity to respond to them
through a formal notice-and-comment period. In addition, Stevens
pointed out that the sources of administrative intent relied upon
by Honda were inconsistent.235 For example, in the government's
brief it conceded that "[a] claim that a manufacturer should have
chosen to install airbags rather than another type of passive re-
straint in a certain model of car because of other design features
particular to that car.., would not necessarily frustrate Standard
208's purposes."236 In light of such weak evidence for federal pre-
emption, Stevens rejected the Court's reliance on conflict "obsta-
cle" preemption analysis.237
Even if conflict preemption principles were to apply in this
case, however, Stevens contested Honda's and the majority's claim
that common law tort actions would frustrate the national purpose
of a gradual phase-in of airbags. 238 First, prior to the adoption of
the 1984 version of the FMVSS, when auto manufacturers were
not required to install passive restraint devices, he could find no
case raising a "no-air bag" claim. 239 Accordingly, since the likeli-
hood of such suits would now be even less for those automobile
manufacturers that are in compliance with the minimum federal
safety standard, Stevens argued that automobile manufacturers
would not feel a significant liability inducement to install more
airbags than required after the adoption of the 1984 federal stan-
dard. 240 Second, due to the protracted nature of tort litigation, the
233. Id. at 910.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 911.
236. Id. at 904-05 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 26
n.23).
237. Id. at 905-06.
238. Id. at 905.
239. Id. at 901.
240. Id.
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phase-in period for the installation of passive restraints will have
ended before the purpose of FMVSS 208 could be frustrated by
tort liability suits, and even if a "no-air bag" lawsuit could be
brought before the phase-in period ended, under the 1984 version
of FMVSS 208 auto manufacturers still had the choice to go with a
passive restraint device other than an airbag.241 Accordingly, "tort
liability would not frustrate the Secretary [of Transportation's]
desire to encourage both experimentation with better passive re-
straint systems and public acceptance of airbags."242 Third, Justice
Stevens contended that the majority overlooked the basic fact that
FMVSS 208 was only a minimum standard and that the Secretary
of Transportation favored a more rapid increase of passive re-
straints.243 For support of this view, he noted that DOT did not
place a ceiling as well as a floor on the annual increase in the re-
quired percentage of passive restraints. 244 Consequently, he con-
tended that "[tihe possibility that exposure to potential tort
liability might accelerate the rate of increase would actually fur-
ther the only goal explicitly mentioned in the standard itself: re-
ducing the number of deaths and severity of injuries of vehicle
occupants." 245 As Stevens saw it, Congress has done nothing to
prevent the imposition of higher standards of care on automobile
manufacturers through traditional common law actions.246 With-
out expressing a view on whether or not the parties in this case
should prevail on the merits, he contended that the Geiers should
have their day in court.247 "The presumption [against preemp-
tion]," wrote Stevens:
[Serves as a limiting principle that prevents federal
judges from running amok with our potentially boundless
(and perhaps inadequately considered) doctrine of implied
conflict pre-emption based on frustration of purposes-
i.e., that state law is pre-empted if it "stands as an obsta-
241. Id. at 901-02.
242. Id. at 903.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 903-04.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 904.
247. Id. at 913.
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cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress." 24s
The majority's decision in Geier is unsatisfying for several
reasons. First, it conducts absolutely no textual analysis of the
statute's language. If the Court engaged in such an analysis, it
would have discovered that the saving clause preserves "liability
under the common law." The ordinary meaning of "safety stan-
dard" under the NTMVSA, as well as its usage in other sections of
the statute, is different from what Congress intended by "re-
quirement" under the FCLAA, and the statute defines "standard"
as a "minimum."249 Not only, then, can it be said that "safety stan-
dard" differs from "requirement" in limiting the preemption provi-
sion to positive regulations passed by legislatures and
administrative agencies, but the saving clause would also mean
that even if an auto manufacturer complied with the "minimum"
federal standard, it could still be held liable under the common
law. Auto manufacturers would only have a preemption defense in
a tort action brought against them if the car in which a person
was injured was equipped with a passive restraint. The NTMVSA,
in short, establishes minimum (not maximum) standards of safety
compliance, and the saving clause preserves common law liability.
By immediately shifting its analysis from an examination of
NTMVSA's express language to the Court's implied conflict pre-
emption principles, the majority does an end-run around the plain
meaning of the saving clause. In essence, the saving clause is read
out of the statute altogether. The failure to conduct a serious ex-
amination of the text of the statute is particularly curious in that
several of the Justices in the majority (most notably, Justice
Scalia 250) claim to be textualists or adherents of the plain meaning
of statutes. 25 1
248. Id. at 907-08 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
249. Id. at 889 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2) (2000)).
250. See, e.g., ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (defending a plain meaning approach to statu-
tory interpretation).
251. Justice Scalia's and Justice Breyer's votes in Geier are interesting in
another respect. These Justices, both former administrative law professors,
participated together in a conference before their appointments to the Su-
preme Court, during which the Court's decision in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n
of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), was ex-
tensively discussed. Both disapproved of the Court's decision in that case,
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The Court's inadequate examination of the plain language of
the statute is only exacerbated by its reliance on administrative
intent to find the common law claims preempted under an implied
conflict "obstacle" theory. Aside from the fact that such adminis-
trative intent is often ambiguous and conflicting-sources of law,
in Justice Stevens' words, that "are even more malleable than leg-
islative history"254--the majority's use of administrative intent to
preempt common law actions raises serious questions about de-
mocratic accountability. Neither the public nor the states had an
opportunity to respond to the sources of intent relied upon by
Honda and the majority. Moreover, as is well known, administra-
tive agencies can be captured by pressure groups that are seeking
to serve the interests of their clients. The car industry, for exam-
ple, had much to gain if it was not required to install airbags in all
of its cars by 1987, and it is safe to assume that its views were
made known to DOT representatives in 1984 when proposed
changes to the FMVSS 208 were under consideration. In fact, one
of the major reasons why DOT went along with the gradual im-
plementation plan was a concern about the costs of installing air-
bags in all passenger vehicles. 253 When seen in this light,
administrative intent should not be made to override the clear
language of a congressional statute. The presumption against pre-
emption requires that a formalized agency rule, after a notice-and-
comment period has taken place, be promulgated before a court
can apply conflict "obstacle" preemption principles. One of the ma-
jor consequences of Geier will be the increasing importance of ad-
ministrative agencies to deprive people of traditional common law
which struck down the Reagan administration's rescission of the FMVSS 208
passed under the Carter administration, and each supported a broad scope of
administrative discretion in rulemaking. Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Judi-
cial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 105 F.R.D. 251, 323-46
(1984); see also Antonin Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 (No. 3) ADMIN. L.
REV. v, v-xi (1982); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 363-98 (1986). One wonders if these two Jus-
tices' intimate knowledge of and familiarity with the administrative back-
ground of FMVSS 208 shaped their views on how to decide the conflict
preemption issue in Geier.
252. Geier, 529 U.S. at 911.
253. Id. at 891.
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remedies. 254 If manufacturers comply with the minimum safety
standards promulgated by administrative agencies, they will be
shielded from tort liability. The majority's use of conflict "obstacle"
preemption analysis in the face of a saving clause is unprece-
dented, and the Justices revisited the same issue during its 2002-03
term, this time ruling against preemption when the administrative
agency decided not to promulgate a regulation requiring a particular
safety device. 255
2. Government Contractor Defense256
Another important implied preemption decision came in Boyle
v. United Technologies Corp.,257 where the issue before the Court
was whether government contractors could share the federal gov-
ernment's sovereign immunity when they execute design specifi-
cations developed or approved by the federal government. 258
Traditionally, government contractors who have strictly complied
with government design specifications have been able to plead two
types of defenses for any damages resulting from such specifica-
tions: (1) the government agency defense, and (2) the contract
specification defense. Under the former, courts have applied prin-
254. See Alexander K. Haas, Chipping Away at State Tort Remedies
Through Pre-emption Jurisprudence: Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 89
CAL. L. REV. 1927 (2001).
255. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) (holding that
neither the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 nor the decision of the Coast
Guard in 1990 not to promulgate a regulation requiring propeller guards on
motorboats preempts a state "no-propeller guard" lawsuit).
256. This section has been substantially reproduced, with permission,
from James B. Staab, The Tenth Amendment and Justice Scalia's "Split Per-
sonality," 16 J.L. & POL. 231, 305-14 (2000).
257. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
258. Sovereign immunity is the common law concept that "the king can do
no wrong," and was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821), where Chief Justice John Mar-
shall claimed that no suit could be commenced against the United States
without its consent. While much of this immunity has been taken away by
the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, federal officials are still immune from
lawsuits where the cause of action is based on the exercise of, or the failure to
exercise, a discretionary function or duty. In its capacity as contractor, the
United States can thus escape from liability in state products liability suits
by asserting sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense. The extent to
which this defense immunizes independent contractors who perform work for
the federal government from similar types of claims is the central issue con-
cerning the government contractor defense.
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ciples of agency to shield government contractors from liability
when the contractor acts pursuant to the authority and direction
of the federal government.259 This defense is rarely invoked and
has been applied only in public works cases.260 It also suffers from
a severe limitation: it does not cover government contractors that
are not employees of the federal government.
The contract specification defense shields government con-
tractors from ordinary negligence claims. If a contractor (private
or public) manufactures products to the order of another party, it
will not be liable for any damages caused by the product's design
unless the specifications provided were so clearly defective and
dangerous that a reasonably prudent contractor should have real-
ized that the product was unsafe. 261 This defense has been invoked
mostly in public works cases, 262 but also (with limited success) in
products liability suits.263 The problem in the latter types of cases
has been the advent of strict liability, which allows plaintiffs to re-
cover from government contractors even if they are not responsi-
ble for the defectively designed equipment that caused their
injuries.
In response to the limitations of these two defenses, the fed-
eral courts fashioned a new defense: the government contractor
defense. 264 Under this defense, courts have recognized that if a
259. The effect of this defense is to impute the negligence of the contractor
to the government, which is immune from suit. See, e.g., Yearsley v. W.A.
Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940) (holding a construction contractor that
built dikes along the Missouri River pursuant to the orders of the federal
government was shielded from liability for negligently eroding ninety-five
acres of private property).
260. See, e.g., Merritt, Chapman, & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.,
295 F.2d 14, 15-16 (9th Cir. 1961); Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 145
N.E. 321, 321-22 (N.Y. 1924).
261. The effect of this defense is to avoid shifting the government's liabil-
ity to the contractor. See, e.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 560 (5th
Cir. 1985) (discussing contractor specification defense).
262. See, e.g., Merritt, Chapman, & Scott Corp., 295 F.2d at 14, 15-16;
Ryan, 145 N.E. at 321, 321-22.
263. See, e.g., Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 82 (5th
Cir. 1975); Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346, 351, 353 (6th Cir.
1974); Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir. 1973); Johnston v.
United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 353-54 (D. Kan. 1983).
264. See, e.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405, 408-09 (4th Cir.
1986); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 740 (11th Cir.
1985); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 1985); Tillet v.
J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1985); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770
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contractor manufactures a product according to the government's
specifications, that contractor should be entitled to share in the
government's sovereign immunity defense and thus be protected
to the same extent that the government would have been pro-
tected had it manufactured the product itself.265 Significantly,
government contractors can plead this defense even if they are not
employees of the government, and since the defense is based on a
shared sovereign immunity concept, they will be immune from all
theories of tort liability.266 In recent years, this defense has been
applied almost exclusively to the area of military procurement
contracts, and thus is sometimes referred to as the "military con-
tractor defense."267 Despite a flurry of lower federal court decisions
on the subject, the Supreme Court had not weighed in on the gov-
ernment contractor defense. Since there was a split in the circuits
over which test to apply in such cases, the Court took the oppor-
tunity to do so by granting certiorari in Boyle v. United Technolo-
gies Corp.268
On April 27, 1983, a United States Marine helicopter crashed
off the coast of Virginia Beach, Virginia, carrying four crew mem-
bers.269 Three of the crew members were able to escape from the
helicopter without serious injury, but the co-pilot, Lieutenant
David A. Boyle, could not open his escape hatch and drowned. 270
F.2d 556, 574 (5th Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444,
448 (9th Cir. 1983); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp.
1046, 1054-55 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
265. Besides an argument based on what might be called a fairness prin-
ciple, there have been a number of other rationales given for the government
contractor defense: (1) to hold military contractors liable for design defects
would subvert the government's immunity-i.e., the costs of design defect
suits will be passed along to the government; (2) holding military contractors
liable for design defects "would thrust the judiciary into the making of mili-
tary decisions" in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; (3) that
military contractors are often unable to negotiate over specifications which,
due to defense requirements, involve risks that would be deemed unreason-
able for ordinary consumer goods; and (4) that the defense encourages gov-
ernment contractors to work closely with government officials in the
development of equipment. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449-50.
266. See id. at 451 (holding a contractor immune even where the govern-
ment only approved design specifications developed by the contractor).
267. Wayne Lindsey Robbins, Jr., The Government Contract Defense After
Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 291, 309 (1989).
268. 487 U.S. 500, 504, 512-13 (1988).
269. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986).
270. Id.
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Boyle's father brought suit against the manufacturer of the heli-
copter, the Sikorsky Division of United Technologies Corporation
(Sikorsky), alleging two theories of liability under Virginia tort
law.271 First, he claimed that Sikorsky negligently repaired the
helicopter's automatic flight control system, resulting in the pilot's
losing control of the helicopter and its eventual crash into the
ocean. 272 Second, he claimed that Sikorsky defectively designed
the co-pilot's emergency escape system: "the escape hatch opened
out instead of in (and was therefore ineffective in a submerged
craft because of water pressure), and access to the escape hatch
handle was obstructed by other equipment."273 A federal district
court jury returned a general verdict in favor of Mr. Boyle and
awarded him $725,000. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, how-
ever, reversed.274 It found, in part, that Sikorsky was immune
from the state tort claims because it satisfied the "military con-
tractor defense," which that court recognized the same day in
Tozer v. LTV Corp.275 Mr. Boyle appealed this ruling.
In a five-to-four decision, Justice Scalia, who was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, and Ken-
nedy, affirmed the lower court's judgment.276 As framed by the
Court, there were two issues for it to decide. First, and most im-
portant, was whether there was a basis in law for the federal
courts to create a government contractor defense. As pointed out
by Justice Brennan in dissent, despite repeated requests for it to
do so, Congress had refused to legislate such a defense. 277 Justice
Scalia, however, held that the federal courts had the authority to
fashion such a defense under federal common law.278 Even "in the
absence of legislation specifically immunizing Government con-
tractors from liability for design defects,"279 he ruled that there are
271. Id. at 413-14.
272. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 503.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. 792 F.2d 403, 408-09 (4th Cir. 1986).
276. The Court did not, however, agree with some of the court of appeals'
analysis, and thus remanded the case for clarification of its ruling. Boyle, 487
U.S. at 514.
277. Id. at 515 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 504.
279. Id.
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a few areas of "uniquely federal interest"280 where the federal
courts have preempted state law under federal common law.28 '
Scalia mentioned two such areas of uniquely federal interest: (1)
obligations to, and rights of, the United States under its contracts,
and (2) civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in the
course of their duty.28 2 Scalia had to concede, however, that nei-
ther of these two examples of uniquely federal interest were at is-
sue here, since neither the federal government, nor one of its
officials, was a party to this lawsuit. Nevertheless, Scalia ex-
tended these two earlier examples of "peculiarly federal concern"
to cover government contractors. According to Scalia, "[i]t makes
little sense to insulate the Government against financial liability
for the judgment that a particular feature of military equipment is
necessary when the Government produces the equipment itself,
but not when it contracts for the production."28 3 It is also apparent
that the Court was concerned about the ability of the federal gov-
ernment to procure military contracts in the future if suits like
this one were permitted to go forward. "The imposition of liability
on Government contractors," Scalia reasoned, "will directly affect
the terms of Government contracts: either the contractor will de-
cline to manufacture the design specified by the Government, or it
will raise its price. Either way, the interests of the United States
will be directly affected."284
Significantly, Justice Scalia tied the justification for the gov-
ernment contractor defense to the discretionary function exception
of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) of 1946-a point not even
argued by counsel in the case. 28 5 This exception immunizes federal
280. Id. (quoting Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630, 640 (1981)).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 504-05.
283. Id. at 512.
284. Id. at 507.
285. Scalia raised this issue several times during oral argument, but
counsel for Sikorsky (as well as for the government) explicitly disclaimed re-
liance on the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. See Reargument
in Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (No. 86-492). In making
this point, Scalia may have relied upon a recent law review article contending
that the government contractor defense was more soundly based on the
FTCA discretionary function exception than on the Feres doctrine. See Rich-
ard Ausness, Surrogate Immunity: The Government Contract Defense and
Products Liability, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 985 (1986). In any event, resting the de-
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officials from liability arising from the exercise of, or the failure to
exercise, a discretionary function or duty. The purpose of the de-
fense is to prevent litigants from bringing suits against the gov-
ernment in order to challenge the correctness of policy decisions
by members of the executive branch. Interestingly, all of the fed-
eral courts that had previously recognized the government con-
tractor defense had based it not on the discretionary function
exception of the FTCA, but on the Feres doctrine.28 6 This doctrine,
which originated in Feres v. United States, immunizes the federal
government from suits brought by servicemen who are injured in
the line of duty. 287 Unlike the discretionary function exception of
the FTCA, where the courts must determine whether the activity
in question involved a policy choice by a government official in or-
der for the sovereign immunity defense to apply, the Feres doc-
trine provides blanket immunity in the narrow area of service-
related suits. 28 8 Although several sketchy rationales have been
given for this doctrine, the most common construction of the deci-
sion is that such immunity will preserve military discipline. 28 9
Justice Scalia explicitly rejected grounding the government
contractor defense on the Feres doctrine, finding that such a ra-
tionale would make the defense both too broad and too narrow.290
fense on the discretionary function exception of the FTCA does substantially
expand the scope of the government contractor defense. See infra note 310
and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986); Bynum v.
FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591
(7th Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983).
287. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
288. This immunity has since been expanded to suits brought by service-
men against government contractors in which the United States is named as
a third-party defendant. See Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431
U.S. 666 (1977) (holding that the rights of a third party to recover in an in-
demnity action against the United States must be limited).
289. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691 (1987).
Moreover, military discipline involves not only obedience to orders,
but more generally duty and loyalty to one's service and to one's
country. Suits brought by service members against the Government
for service-related injuries could undermine the commitment essen-
tial to effective service and thus have the potential to disrupt mili-
tary discipline in the broadest sense of the word.
Id.
290. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510. Justice Scalia might have also avoided basing
the government contractor defense on the Feres doctrine because, only one
year earlier, he had sharply criticized the Court's decision recognizing such
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It would be too broad because it would absolve government con-
tractors from suits by military personnel even when no policy
judgment has been made by the federal government. 291 It would be
too narrow because it arbitrarily limits immunity to suits brought
by servicemen and not by civilians that might be the incidental
victims of poorly designed equipment.292 In Scalia's view, the dis-
cretionary function exception of the FTCA conforms better with
the central purpose of the government contractor defense: it pre-
vents injured parties from indirectly questioning the wisdom of
governmental decisions by bringing tort suits against the contrac-
tors that implement those decisions.293
The second issue for the Court was the proper test to apply in
government contractor cases. 294 On this question, there was a split
among the circuits. Most circuits followed the three-part test of
McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., which absolves govern-
ment contractors from liability for design defects in military
equipment under state law if: (1) the United States approved rea-
sonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to
those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States
about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to
the supplier but not to the United States.295 Because this test only
requires that the government approve, not formulate, the design
feature in question, it is fairly easy to satisfy. In modern practice,
where considerable discretion is given to private contractors that
design equipment for the federal government, this test basically
requires a rubber stamp from some federal official. 296
an immunity. See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 692-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the Feres doctrine runs afoul of the plain language of the Federal
Tort Claims Act of 1946).
291. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510. For example, the Feres rationale for the de-
fense would immunize government contractors from liability when the fed-
eral government buys a helicopter from stock that is already equipped with a
defective escape hatch. Id.
292. Id. at 510-11.
293. Id. at 511-12.
294. Id. at 509-13.
295. 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792
F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352, 354-
55 (3d Cir. 1985); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 574 (5th Cir. 1985);
Tillet v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 598-99 (7th Cir. 1985).
296. See Harry A. Austin, Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation: A
Questionable Expansion of the Government Contract Defense, 23 GA. L. REV.
227, 243 (1988) ("Modern weapons procurement commonly proceeds with the
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The second test derives from the Eleventh Circuit in Shaw v.
Grumman Aerospace Corp., which precludes suits against gov-
ernment contractors if: (1) the contractor did not participate, or
participated only minimally, in the design of the defective equip-
ment; or (2) the contractor warned the government in a timely
fashion about the risks of the design and notified it of alternative
designs reasonably known by it, and the government, although
forewarned, authorized the contractor to proceed with the danger-
ous design anyway. 297 Because the contractor must prove that it
did not participate (or participated only minimally) in the design
of the product, the Shaw test is more difficult to satisfy.
Justice Scalia ruled in favor of the McKay test, because the
Shaw test "is not a rule designed to protect the federal interest
embodied in the 'discretionary function' exemption [of the
FTCA]."298 Even if the contractor ultimately develops the design,
Scalia argued that it may still "reflect a significant policy judg-
ment by government officials."299 Moreover, because he believed
that the Shaw test penalizes contractors who do not identify all
known design defects to the government, it would deter "active
contractor participation in the design process."300
In dissent, Justice William J. Brennan, who was joined by
Justices Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun and John Paul Ste-
vens, accused the majority of reinventing federal common law.30 1
Brennan pointed out that Congress had been asked on several oc-
casions to legislate a government contractor defense, but had re-
fused to do so. 302 In the absence of such authorization, he claimed
that the Court lacked the authority to fashion such an immunity:
government informing the contractor of its needs, after which the government
either works with the contractor to develop a design or merely lets the con-
tractor design the equipment.").
297. 778 F.2d 736, 745-46 (11th Cir. 1985).
298. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 513 (1988).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 518-19.
302. Id. at 515 n.1. Brennan accused the majority of the worst form of ju-
dicial legislating: "The Court-unelected and unaccountable to the people-
has unabashedly stepped into the breach to legislate a rule denying Lt.
Boyle's family the compensation that state law assures them. This time the
injustice is the Court's own making." Id. at 515-16.
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Were I a legislator, I would probably vote against any
law absolving multibillion dollar private enterprises from
answering for their tragic mistakes, at least if that law
were justified by no more than the unsupported specula-
tion that their liability might ultimately burden the
United States Treasury. Some of my colleagues here
would evidently vote otherwise (as they have here), but
that should not matter here. We are judges not legisla-
tors, and the vote is not ours to cast.30 3
Brennan also challenged the leading rationale behind the
government contractor defense: that the cost of products liability
suits will be passed along to the government, thereby affecting its
ability to administer public programs. 30 4 Brennan doubted that
this actually happens in the real world, but noted that, in any
event, the Court had rejected such reasoning for immunizing gov-
ernment contractors in previous cases.305 He also argued that even
if it could be assumed that the federal government will indirectly
pay the cost of successful suits brought against government con-
tractors, the marginal benefit of such a defense should not over-
ride the central purpose of the tort system in the United States:
that the quality of products will be ensured if manufacturers are
held responsible for the injuries resulting from their defectively
designed products.3 6 As Brennan saw it, this novel, judicially cre-
ated, sovereign immunity defense, represents a substantial wind-
fall to government contractors. 3 7 "If the system is working as it
should," he reasoned, "Government contractors will design equip-
ment to avoid certain injuries (like the deaths of soldiers or Gov-
ernment employees), which would be certain to burden the
Government."308 Thus, tort liability will not "result in a net burden
on the Government (let alone a clearly excessive net burden)";
rather, it will result in "a net gain."30 9
303. Id. at 531.
304. Id. at 522.
305. Id. at 522-26.
306. Id. at 530.
307. Id. at 530-31.
308. Id. at 530.
309. Id.
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Finally, Brennan raised concerns about the scope of the ma-
jority's government contractor defense. 310 Since the defense was
grounded on the discretionary function exception of the FTCA,
Brennan noted that the majority expanded the defense beyond
what the lower federal courts had previously recognized in two
ways. First, the defense now covers defectively designed commer-
cial equipment produced for the government.311 Second, it shields
government contractors from civilian claimants who are injured
by defectively designed products.312 As Brennan put it:
It applies not only to military equipment like the CH-
53D helicopter, but (so far as I can tell) to any made-to-
order gadget that the Federal Government might pur-
chase after previewing plans - from NASA's Challenger
space shuttle to the Postal Service's old mail cars. The
contractor may invoke the defense in suits brought not
only by military personnel like Lt. Boyle, or Government
employees, but by anyone injured by a Government con-
tractor's negligent design, including, for example, the
children who might have died had respondent's helicopter
crashed on the beach. 31 3
The majority's decision in Boyle illustrates the extent to which
the conservatives will go to find federal preemption of state law.
Since there was no governing statute in the case, the Court was,
by any objective analysis, on shaky ground in fashioning a gov-
ernment contractor defense. Justice Scalia's willingness to invoke
310. Id. at 516.
311. Id. Although many courts have rejected applying the government
contractor defense to cases involving nonmilitary equipment produced for the
federal government, not all courts have. Compare In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos
Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 810-12 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the government
contractor defense was not available to manufacturers of asbestos insulation
products which exposed sailors to asbestos dust), with Carley v. Wheeled
Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1125 (3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing government contrac-
tor defense in a suit by an emergency medical technician alleging that the
ambulance in which she was injured was defectively designed). This is an im-
portant expansion of the defense, since military equipment comprises only
about ten percent of the contracts entered into between private contractors
and the federal government. See also Steven Brian Loy, The Government
Contractor Defense: Is it a Weapon only for the Military?, 83 KY. L.J. 505
(1994).
312. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 514, 516 (1988).
313. Id.
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federal common law in a preemption case also contradicts his
sharp criticism of "judicial legislating" in other areas of the law. 314
Geier and Boyle suggest that the conservatives are favorably dis-
posed toward federal preemption in products liability cases. In ad-
dition to these types of cases, they have also voted in favor of
federal preemption in cases involving foreign affairs, 315 occupa-
tional safety,316 consumer protection,31 7 environmental regula-
tion,318 and bankruptcy.3 9 This is not meant to suggest that the
conservatives have supported preemption in every case. They have
314. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
The outcome of today's case will doubtless be heralded as a triumph
of judicial statesmanship. It is not that, unless it is statesmanlike
needlessly to prolong this Court's self-awarded sovereignty over a
field [abortion] where it has little proper business since the answers
to most of the cruel questions posed are political and not juridi-
cal ....
Id. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring); Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990).
While I agree with the Court's analysis today, and therefore join in
its opinion, I would have preferred that we announce, clearly and
promptly, that the federal courts have no business in this field; that
American law has always accorded the State the power to prevent,
by force if necessary, suicide-including suicide by refusing to take
appropriate measures necessary to preserve one's life ....
Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
315. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388
(2000) (holding that a Massachusetts provision restricting state agencies
from conducting business with Burma (Myanmar) was preempted by federal
law).
316. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992)
(ruling that state law requirements concerning job safety were preempted by
Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations).
317. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992)
(holding that the enforcement of the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral fare advertising guidelines through a state general consumer protection
law was preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978).
318. See, e.g., U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding the state of Wash-
ington's rules regarding oil tanker ship crew training and English language
skills, navigation watch, and marine casualty reporting preempted by federal
law); Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (ruling that the Clean
Water Act preempts state law to the extent that it seeks to impose liability on
a point source in another state).
319. See, e.g., Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991) (holding that the federal
Bankruptcy Act preempted a Florida law exempting property that was under
a judicially-imposed state lien from seizure by the federal bankruptcy court).
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not.320 But their opinions strongly demonstrate a predisposition in
favor of preemption, rather than the traditional presumption
against it.
III. CONCLUSION
The inconsistencies between the Rehnquist Court's Tenth and
Eleventh Amendment decisions, on the one hand, and its preemp-
tion decisions, on the other, are interesting and beg important ques-
tions. As noted at the outset, from 1986-2002 the ranking of the
Rehnquist Court Justices in terms of the percentage of cases in
which the Justices supported the federal government in preemption
cases is almost the exact opposite of the individual voting behavior
of the Justices in all types of federalism cases, including the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments. While the conservative bloc of the
Rehnquist Court has made substantial strides in protecting the sov-
ereign interests of the states under the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, it has been the chief defender of the national govern-
ment in preemption cases. If one considers the types of cases in
which the Rehnquist Court conservatives have favored preemption
(admittedly not always as a unified bloc), it is easy to see how they
fit within a conservative political agenda. In Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., five of the then conservatives 321 plus Justice Stevens ar-
gued that at least some common law tort actions should be pre-
empted under the 1969 amendments to the FCLAA.322 In Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,323 the current five-justice conservative bloc
ruled that the FCLAA preempted state restrictions on cigarette ad-
vertising directed toward children. In Medtronic v. Lohr,324 four of
the current conservatives, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
argued that the MDA's pre-market clearance procedures preempted
several common law tort theories claiming injuries as a result of a
320. E.g., Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 383 (1987) (holding that a Vir-
ginia regulation limiting a person's eligibility for benefits under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program was not preempted); Wis. Pub.
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 606 (1987) (ruling that the Federal In-
secticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act did not preempt a local ordinance
governing the aerial spraying of pesticides).
321. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and
Thomas.
322. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-31 (1992).
323. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001).
324. 518 U.S. 470, 509 (1996). See discussion supra p. 154.
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defective pacemaker. In Geier v. American Honda Motor Com-
pany,325 four of the five current conservatives, plus Justice Stephen
G. Breyer, ruled that the FMVSS 208 impliedly preempts state com-
mon law suits against car manufacturers for failing to install
airbags as passive restraint devices. And in Boyle v. United Tech-
nologies Corp.,326 four of the current conservatives, plus then-
Associate Justice Byron White, resurrected federal common law by
finding a novel sovereign immunity defense protecting government
contractors from lawsuits when they defectively design products for
the national government. Perhaps emblematic of the new conserva-
tive attitude toward preemption is the partial dissent filed by Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia (and joined by Justice Clarence Thomas) in
Cipollone, where he chided the majority for creating novel limita-
tions on federal authority and predicted that as a result of the
Court's decision only "the most sporting of congresses will dare to
say anything about pre-emption."327
The aforementioned products liability decisions by the
Rehnquist Court conservatives will inure to the benefit of "big busi-
ness." By absolving corporations from state common law liability
under the Court's preemption doctrine these companies will become
less accountable to the public for their actions. In an area in which
there is considerable discretion to determine whether Congress in-
tended to preempt state law, the Rehnquist Court has not been hesi-
tant to rule in favor of the federal government when, in so doing, it
will achieve conservative purposes. The Rehnquist Court's preemp-
tion decisions reveal that the conservatives' overall approach to fed-
eralism cases is unprincipled and politically driven. In light of the
Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment decisions, one would expect
that the conservatives would be more deferential toward the tradi-
tional functions of the states in preemption cases. However, this is
simply not the case.
325. 529 U.S. 861 (2000). See discussion supra p. 162.
326. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). See discussion supra p. 174.
327. 505 U.S. 504, 548 (1992). See discussion supra p. 143.
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APPENDIX
U.S. Supreme Court Justices' Support for the Federal
Government in Federalism and Preemption Cases, 1986-2002
FEDERALISM
(Including Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Cases)
Stephen Breyer 65 2%
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 60.8
David Souter 59.1
John Paul Stevens 54.6
Antonin Scalia 52.3
Anthony Kennedy 50.5
Sandra Day O'Connor 47.6
William H. Rehnquist 45.9
Clarence Thomas 43.5
PREEMPTION
Antonin Scalia 66.7%
Sandra Day O'Connor 60.5
Anthony Kennedy 60.5
William H. Rehnquist 57.4
Clarence Thomas 53.6
David Souter 50.0
Stephen Breyer 47.6
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 45.8
John Paul Stevens 41.3
Data Source: United States Supreme Court Judicial Database,
1953-2002 Terms, www.usscplus.com, (Harold J. Spaeth, Principal
Investigator) Michigan State University, 2002.
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